/209/

273 271 177 The beverage of the Sanemá is water. They do not make alcoholic beverages. In recent times the Sanemá who live in contact with the Makiritare have learned to prepare cashíri, and they are beginning to drink it with some frequency. Nevertheless, the preparation of alcoholic beverages is not common among the Sanemá and Yanoama in general.

252 263 261 The greater part of their food is toasted or broiled in the coals. They do not eat salt, properly speaking, but they use wood ashes and peppers. They also clean dry clay and eat it.

276 As stimulants they have tobacco and yopo. They do not smoke, but rather roll up the tobacco leaves, and, after treating them with ashes, they put them in back of the lower lip. The yopo is made with certain leaves and ashes of bark. It seems that they have several kinds, according to the degree of strength. They showed us a gray type and a black one. One who wishes to take a dose puts the intoxicating powder in a tube and a companion blows it into his nose. In general, yopo is related to religious ideas. It appears that they take it at burial ceremonies when they accompany a deceased person and his "híkula upwards." The theurgists also use it frequently in their various ceremonies. There are known cases in which a man "flew off" with a strong dose of yopo and, losing his way, never came back to earth!

[764]

581 183 591 184 The founding of a family is the fervent desire of all the young people of the tribe. We observed a degree of irregularity in the custom of determining the matrimonial residence. In the Sanemá group of the Erebato, this seems to be bilocal, as among the Waica of the upper Orinoco (Barker, 1953, p. 478), while on the Ventuari we noticed a tendency toward unilocality. We are not certain, but it would seem that normal residence is initially matrilocal with postmatrimonial betrothal service and then changes to bilocal. This arrangement brings about the formation of bilocal extended families in Yanoama society.

591 182 596

596 591 Societies with bilocal extended families are relatively rare, but their existence among the Sanemá does not surprise us if we bear in mind that the economic situation of the tribe lends

726 /476/ In general prolonged sieges are not attempted, out of fear that someone who came to visit the besieged settlement might have seen the attackers and gone in search of help. As a result of this the source that supplies them with water is generally not defended.

Frequently, before carrying out a larger attack, the attacking settlement moves into the forest so that the families may be sheltered while the men go out to battle.

583 628 If two young persons wish to marry, but one or both of their settlements do not favor their matrimonial union, they may flee to a settlement where they will be accepted and establish their home there. If they do not find a settlement that will shelter them, they must separate and try to contract marriage by the usual means, or they have to abandon their plan altogether.

586 628 A wife maltreated by her husband may flee from him by going to a settlement prepared to defend her, or to one where her husband would not dare go because of being considered an enemy there.

If a wife runs off alone or with another man, the husband may organize an expedition armed with macanas or clubs to regain her, but in this case, too, he can only make one single attempt. If she has taken the children with her, he can try to recover both the wife and the children or only the children, or some of them.

586 If a man abandons his wife, in general nothing can be done about it.

If the man and the woman separate by mutual agreement, the former generally keeps the children. Sometimes the smaller children remain at the side of the mother until they are of sufficient age to cook their own platanos (perhaps five or six years old).

587 The second marriage differs very little from the first marriage. In the majority of cases a virgin is preferred to a widow or to a married fugitive.

581 No man remains unmarried by his own will. If he is unmarried, it is because he has not been able to obtain a wife.

[Introductory, p. iii]

Genealogical data in both sociological and biological form are given for one small village to demonstrate the dual organization tendency. Similar data on two other villages from which this sample village recently split are presented to show that affinal ties between local descent groups are structurally more stable than agnatic ties between such groups, and that these affinal ties hold local descent groups together when larger villages fragment, resulting in the break-up of lineages and the redistribution of their members into mutually hostile, independent villages.

The intensity and tactics of warfare are shown to determine in large measure both the size of the village and the political conditions that promote inter-village alliances based on marriage. Finally, the techniques of slash-and-burn horticulture are discussed to show how economic dependence on cultivated food promotes the establishment of political alliances based on marriage exchanges and determines the direction of movement of relocated villages.

Three conclusions are drawn from the analysis. First, the frequency of intra-village fighting and inter-village warfare co-varies with the frequency with which males may legitimately satisfy sexual desires; anything that increases female/male ratio or the sexual activity of females reduces feuding. Second, the degree to which marriage practice conforms to marriage rules is predictable once the conditions of warfare are specified. When warfare is chronic, alliances between historically unrelated villages require a breach of marriage rules when women pass between these groups. Comparative data on Brazilian Yąnomamö social organization are given to support these conclusions. Third, the data bearing on Yąnomamö social organization support E. R. Leach's contention that the political and economic contexts within which marriages take place must be considered as part of the ongoing social organization and must be included in analyses of the latter. By so doing, the analysis shows that integration between Yąnomamö lineal descent corporations does not necessarily derive from inherent properties cognatic kinship as argued by Meyer Fortes.

I. Marriage Ties

602 593 581 583 [609] Marriages bind the groups of the spouses to each other in a system of exchanges involving goods, services, and the promise to reciprocate women at a later date. Yanomamö marriage is peculiar in that the ties between husband and wife are very weak, but that ties between a man and his sister's husband are strong. The significance of marriage as an institution that initiates (or continues) alliances between non-agnatic groups stems, therefore, from the nature of the ties that it creates between the male members of the allied groups.

593 Ties between spouses are usually very tenuous, due largely to the fact that men are constantly suspicious of their wives' motives whenever the women leave the village unescorted. Men always suspect their wives of infidelity, and will even beat them if there is the slightest suspicion that the women have been seeing other men. A certain amount of 837 593 trysting goes on in all villages, but it is more frequent and more easily accomplished in larger villages. Discovery of [578] liaisons by the cuckold inevitably leads to club fighting between the factions of the lover and the husband. The woman 593 684 involved usually suffers more than either of the male principals in the fighting that follows, as women are severely punished by their husbands. The punishment usually consists of a beating with a club, but men frequently shoot their unfaithful wives with barbed arrows in a non-vital area of the body, such as the buttocks or leg. In one instance I witnessed,

607 groups of Yąnomamö have begun referring to the entire tribe
601 as "Los Shori." The Yąnomamö address the missionaries with
799 this term hoping to maximize their chances of obtaining
[609] desirable manufactured goods such as machetes and axes.
[01]

607 Men who are not related by blood constantly remind
521 each other of obligations when they use this kinship term.
601 A brother-in-law deserves respect, fair treatment, and gratitude. As the term is reciprocal, a conversation between two shoriwë is punctuated frequently by these constant reminders that each owes the other goods, services and respect by virtue of the fact that they stand in wife-giver/wife-receiver relationship to each other. Such conversations, usually about material goods or women, strike the outsider as something of verbal contests to determine which of the two speakers is more of a shoriwë than the other, i.e., who owes the other more goods, services, gratitude and generosity. One who has actually given a sister to the other's group has an advantage, in a trading sense, as he can more legitimately claim goods from the wife receiver.

*628 When men visit the village of an ally to beg, trade or
574 participate in feasts, they call all non-related men of that
609 village 'brother-in-law,' emphasizing the fact that they
601 stand in wife-giver relationship to them, and deserve, therefore, the generosity of the hosts.
583

*628 Alliances between villages involve, in addition to
527 military aid, mutual feasting and trading. It must be
574 remembered that alliances, no matter how many marriage ex-
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628 574 527 [583] [581] changes bind the villages to each other, are weak and unstable. The more frequently allies visit and feast with each other, the less likely treachery will take place, as a certain amount of trust and friendship is generated by visiting and feasting.

628 438 433 The tendency for Yąnomamö villages to create artificial shortages of certain manufactured items is related to feasting and the creation of organic solidarity of a sort. After Yąnomamö villages enter into alliances, they tend to adjust their economic production of such items as bows, arrow cane, spun cotton, tobacco, baskets, cultivated drugs, dogs and clay cooking pots. Any village is capable of producing all of these goods, but allied villages create shortages of some of these items so that they can become dependent on the productivity of their allies, thereby having excuses to visit and trade.

628 438 527 574 607 One of the most significant relationship in trading between villages is the shoriwë tie, and these men trade with each other whenever they visit. As a trade frequently involves feasting, the specialization in production of specific items leads to greater solidarity between allied villages. Although it would be an error simply to identify the role of shoriwë with that of trading partner, this aspect of the shoriwë tie, particularly between men of different villages, is by no means negligible in accounting for the solidarity this relationship promotes in inter-village political ties.

628 438 527 574 The way the trading is conducted also contributes to

628 581 607 Affinal ties between villages, therefore, owe their ability to promote solidarity between the allies to the obligations, duties and trading relationships that marriages impose on brothers-in-law.

607 602 621 591 Within villages, brothers-in-law have similar obligations to each other. The strength of the co-residential shoriwë ties, however, is influenced by other factors besides promises to exchange goods, women, and services. First, co-residence itself promotes a certain amount of amity between all classes of kin. Second, co-residential shoriwë are usually cognatically related because their respective agnatic groups have exchanged women in ascending generations, i.e., many of them are related to each other as MoBrSo or FaSiSo. So, in addition to mere promises to give women to each other, co-residential shoriwë ties are strengthened by ties of cognatic kinship and co-residence.

609 602 621 613 582 584 The strength of the ties between co-residential shoriwë is best illustrated by contrasting it to the weakness of the agnatic tie between two local descent groups of the same lineage. In anticipation of the discussion of agnatic relationship, I will point out here that the political interests of local descent groups focus on acquisition of women from other descent groups within the village. When a village has two or more agnatically related descent groups, the men in these respective groups are de facto rivals for the women in the village. Simultaneously, these distantly related agnates are frequently competitors in the disposition of some female agnates who do not belong unambiguously to one or the other local descent groups.

[Namowei-tedi Group]

The headman of Wareta-tedi, Shamaiyowë, and some of his kinsmen went to visit their allies on the latter's invitation, but Husirawë's group treacherously killed Shamaiyowë and two of his followers. Not wanting to participate in the raiding against their old allies, the Namowei-tedi established a new garden and moved away from the Wareta-tedi. A number of individuals in the present populations of Patanowë-tedi and Bisaasi-tedi trace descent back to the headman of Wareta-tedi, as the latter had demanded women in return for his protection. In ca. 1910 the Namowei-tedi moved to their new garden at Namowei.

Area 3: Namowei-tedi

This area is quite mountanous and the group took its name from one of the ranges, Namowei-kïkë--"sharpness." They lived here long enough to make three different gardens (Makei, Shedemi, and Amatakë), but ultimately were forced to abandon the area because of renewed raiding from their old enemies, the Boreta-tedi. Having no friends to the north and several old enemies to the east, the Namowei-tedi moved west and established their garden at Hahoyaoba-tïka in ca. 1920.

Area 4: Hahoyaoba-tedi

The old allies of the Namowei-tedi, the Wareta-tedi, were forced to abandon their site and move west. They settled in the area immediately south of the Namowei-tedi, splitting into two villages (Hasaböwë-tedi and Ashadowë-tedi), and continued to remain on good terms with the Namowei-tedi.

The major effect of these raids, apart from the ten lives they claimed, was that the Patanowë-tedi had to move frequently from one site to another. The Monou-tedi, who were raiding the Patanowë-tedi, were being raided intensively also. They, too, had to move frequently to avoid the raids. Both groups had to rely on allies to give them refuge during the dry season, the time of the year when raiding is most intense. It will be apparent below how crucial allies are to villages that are being raided frequently, and how agricultural practices necessitate these allies. Finally, the events discussed below will illustrate the degree to which consanguineal ties between mutually hostile villages are able to mitigate the hostilities between these villages.

The war between Monou-tedi and Patanowë-tedi

After the Mamowei-tedi group split at the site of Patanowë in the early '40s, the two factions entered into a period of hostility that lasted until one of the factions, the present groups of Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi, moved out of the area. Raiding between the two factions ceased after 1950, and each group entered into political alliances with unrelated neighboring villages.

In the middle '50s, a rapprochement between the two factions was attempted. A few individuals from Monou-tedi began visiting Patanowë-tedi, and one of them, Torokoiwë, was given two wives by the Patanowë-tedi. The rapprochement, however, was never effected and the political relationships between

628 721 the Patanowä-tedi for managing to overwhelm their own force led them to declare war on the Patanowä-tedi. The Monou-tedi 782 241 immediately began making a new garden at Moyenaböwei, across 726 the Mavaca River from their village and several hours inland, anticipating the war that they knew would follow. After they had cleared the large trees from their new garden site, they raided the Patanowä-tedi in the last week of January 1965, and succeeded in killing Bosibrei.

727 581 582 693 628 Another important event took place while the Monou-tedi were clearing the trees from their new garden site, an event that illustrates the same principle of political philosophy. One of the stolen women, Kakoma, was given to a young man, Karidimö, who had only one leg. Karidimö could not do heavy work, and when his village moved inland to clear their new site Karidimö moved to Bisaasi-tedi with his new wife. Kakoma, however, was not pleased with her new husband, and asked the Bisaasi-tedi if she could stay with them, hoping that she would be permitted to rejoin the Patanowä-tedi if they returned to Bisaasi-tedi to visit. The Bisaasi-tedi men obligingly took her away from Karidimö by force and gave her to a bachelor in their own village. Karidimö, enraged at this, returned to Monou-tedi to recruit aid.

628 721 578 This put the Monou-tedi in a difficult position. They were planning to raid the Patanowä-tedi and would have to maintain good relations with the Bisaasi-tedi if the revenge raids from the Patanowä-tedi became intense. They could not, however, overlook the insult to Karidimö, for this

114 12| 602 Among the Yąnomamö consanguineal kinship does not have the quality attributed to kinship in general by Fortes, and we therefore cannot explain the stability that exists in terms of these alleged properties. The fact that affinal ties do promote a certain amount of stability between Yąnomamö descent groups supports Leach's arguments, and, for the reasons implied by Leach: Yąnomamö marriages occur within a political context that promotes military obligations and concomitants not predictable from first principles regarding the putative nature of kinship itself. Descent groups exchange women with an eye toward maximizing military advantage in a milieu of hostile political relationships. The stability brought about by such marriages is, therefore, largely a function of the politico-military ends served by marriage and is only tangentially, if at all, a result of kinship.

12| I would also like to discuss the nature of the relationship between corporation and descent from another point of view, for the nature of the estate of the Yąnomamö descent corporation gives a particular quality to the corporation. Most corporate lineal descent groups have as one of their major functions the control over and disposition of property. The property is usually real property. Pastoralists, of course, have as their estates, herds and use rights to forage areas. Some Northwest Coast and northern California tribes have corporate groups whose estates are acorn groves and portions of salmon streams.

In addition to real property, corporate groups

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Monou-teri, Lower Bisaasi-teri, and Kąobawä's group. All their other neighbors, allied to the victims of the treacherous feast, relentlessly raided them. They were, in short, extremely dependent on Kąobawä's group and the two other villages related to Kąobawä's group.

Kąobawä and his followers have astutely finessed this situation in two ways. First, they have managed to coerce the two Shamatari villages into ceding women without reciprocating an equal number of their own in return. The men who have obtained Shamatari wives have, as well, managed to cut short their period of bride service in the Shamatari village. Conversely, Shamatari men who have been promised women of Kąobawä's group are pressed into very lengthy bride service, sometimes up to three years. Secondly, Kąobawä's group has prevented the two Shamatari allies from re-establishing friendly contacts with the other Shamatari to their southeast by chicane, threat, and intimidation. One of the two Shamatari allies, the Reyaboböwei-teri, has attempted a rapprochement with the Shamatari enemies of Kąobawä's group. In 1965, several months after I had been living in Kąobawä's village, Kąobawä's group managed to stage another treacherous feast for the old enemies by taking advantage of the renewed ties between the Reyaboböwei-teri and the enemies. They learned that the Reyaboböwei-teri planned to invite one of the villages to a feast, so they, along with the Monou-teri, Lower Bisaasi-teri, and Mõmariböwei-teri, went to the feast in order to ambush the guests. The Reyaboböwei-teri, however, were reluctant to go through with the plan and warned the visitors about it. The visitors were en route to the village when word of the treachery reached them. This had the effect of creating even more difficulties for the Reyaboböwei-teri, for it is highly unlikely that they will succeed in gaining the confidence of their neighbors to the southeast. Nevertheless, some visiting between the groups still continues.[17]

The historical relationships between the villages helps account for the reasons behind contemporary alliance patterns. The discrepancy between marriage rules and actual marriage practice in Lower Bisaasi-teri is a result of the political advantages that group enjoys over one of its allies. It has used this advantage to gain a favorable imbalanced marriage exchange pattern, but one that is only temporary. The Shamatari are also shrewd in their alliance practices, and have succeeded in neutralizing their disadvantages by capitalizing on schisms between Kąobawä's group and Lower Bisaasi-teri. This has been done largely by confining their marriage exchanges to important men in the dominant lineages of Upper and Lower Bisaasi-teri. One of the Shamatari villages, Mõmaribowei-teri, has restricted its exchanges to Lower Bisaasi-teri and Monou-teri, while completely ignoring Upper Bisaasi-teri. The other Shamatari village has given its women only to Upper Bisaasi-teri. This has resulted in the weakening of ties between the three villages of Upper Bisaasi-teri, Lower Bisaasi-teri, and Monou-teri, whose members are

[17] I plan to use these visiting ties to establish contact with the Shamatari villages in that area, none of which have had contact with outsiders. These unconnected Shamatari, however, know who I am because I attempted to reach them in 1965. They subsequently sent a message out urging me to visit them, angry because my guides forced me to turn back on my first attempt. In 1966 they even sent an old man to Kąobawä's village by way of Reyaboböwei-teri with an invitation for me to visit them. I had already left Venezuela by that time. Most of the men in the two contacted Shamatari villages tried to prevent me from going by telling horrible tales of the treachery that awaited my visit, describing how the Shamatari will kill me. The truth of the matter is that they know that I will bring the unconnected Shamatari machetes and axes that might otherwise be given to them. The headman of one of the unconnected villages has a brother in Mõmariböwei-teri. He privately conceded that no harm would befall me and offered to take me to visit in 1967. He was, unfortunately, bitten by a snake just before I arrived in March of 1967, and my plans were deferred until 1968.

related agnatically to each other, and who share a common history. That is, they have lost solidarity as a network of allied villages and, therefore, some of the advantages they enjoyed as wife receivers with respect to the Shamatari villages. They are less able to behave as a single political entity and force the Shamatari to cede women because the Shamatari have given them women in such a way so as to make them competitors with each other. This has also weakened the ties between the two Shamatari villages, which are also related to each other by agnatic ties and common history because each group has linked its political fate with the affairs of different allies. Nevertheless, the two Shamatari villages have, by exchanging women in this fashion, reduced the solidarity of the group of villages that once stood as a unified political bloc that coerced them out of women.

This can be demonstrated in two ways. During the period 1964–1966, Upper and Lower Bisasi-teri still maintained a common village and entertained visitors as a group. Near the end of this period, after the marriage exchanges had begun to show their effects, they abandoned the common village and began to entertain allies independently of each other. At that time they had together managed to acquire two dozen or so women from the Shamatari while having given or promised only a half-dozen in return. When I returned in 1967, the situation had changed appreciably. There were many more Shamatari men living in the group because they had been given women; that is, the exchanges were more balanced. Moreover, the relationships between Upper and Lower Bisasi-teri were not as amicable as they had been the previous year; each group was becoming more involved in the obligations it had acquired by entering into marriage exchanges with one of the two Shamatari villages. Just before I returned, there was a club fight involving all of the villages: The Upper Bisasi-teri and Reyaboböwei-teri fought, as a group, against the Lower Bisasi-teri and Mĩŋamiböwei-teri; that is, the groups that had entered into marriage exchanges with each other behaved as a unit and fought against their close agnates and erstwhile allies. A group of men from Mĩŋamiböwei-teri forcefully took a woman from the Reyaboböwei-teri, thereby precipitating a challenge to a club fight. The Monou-teri participated in the club fight as well, taking the side of the Mĩŋamiböwei-teri, from whom they had taken several women and to whom they had promised several.

Finally, the political situation altered somewhat. When the alliance first developed between Kąobawĩ's group and the two Shamatari villages in 1960, the political milieu was quite serene. The treacherous feast resulted in a bloody war, but the two Shamatari villages sustained most of the losses. Therefore, the Shamatari allies required the assistance of Kąobawĩ's group more than the latter needed their help, since Kąobawĩ's group had no active wars at the time. In 1965, however, the Monou-teri renewed their old war with the Patanowĩ-teri and it subsequently involved Kąobawĩ's group and Lower Bisasi-teri. Only then did they require military assistance from the Shamatari, and only then did the marriage exchanges tend to balance. I will discuss the development of this war in Chapter 4.

Marriage in Yąnomamö society is the result, therefore, of many considerations. It is not merely the outcome of a blind subscription to a rule that enjoins males to marry women of a specific category, for in many cases the political affairs of the group oblige people to give their daughters to men in other villages. The Yąnomamö are practical and enterprising in this regard, particularly those in small villages. The capacity to exist as an independent but small group is greatly enhanced by creating alliances with members

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of other villages—such alliances are stabilised by exchanges of women between the partners, a breach of the prescriptive marriage rules. It is for this reason that such a large discrepancy exists between the ideal behavior and the actual practice, as noted in Table 2.[18]

Division of Labor and Daily Social Life

The daily activities and general social life are not as circumscribed by rules and regulations as would appear from the foregoing discussion. In fact, one first has the impression that chaos rather than order reigns over the daily activities of the village members![19] Thus, while ideal rules about behavior definitely exist, individuals have a great deal of freedom to manipulate their behavior in such a way that they are not unduly encumbered by them. Most of the run-of-the-mill activities of daily life are not characterized by inflexible prescriptions regarding proper behavior.

MALE-FEMALE DIVISION There are a number of distinctions based on status differences that are important in daily life. Perhaps the most conspicuous and most important is the distinction between males and females.

Yanomamö society is decidedly masculine. As was discussed earlier, there is a definite preference to have male children, resulting in a higher incidence of female infanticide as opposed to male infanticide. Female children assume duties and responsibilities in the household long before their brothers are obliged to participate in useful domestic tasks. For the most part, little girls are obliged to tend their younger brothers and sisters, although they are also expected to help their mothers in other chores such as cooking, hauling water, and collecting firewood. By the time girls have reached puberty they have already learned that their world is decidedly less attractive than that of their brothers.

As members of local descent groups, girls have almost no voice in the decisions reached by their agnates concerning their marriage. They are largely pawns to be disposed of by their kinsmen, and their wishes are given very little consideration. In many cases, the girl has been promised to a man long before she reaches puberty, and in some cases her husband actually raises her for part of her childhood. In short, they do not participate as equals in the political affairs of the corporate kinship group and seem to inherit most of the duties without enjoying many of the privileges.

Marriage does not enhance the status of the girl, for her duties as wife require her to assume difficult and laborious tasks too menial to be executed by the men. For the most part these include the incessant demands for firewood and drinking water, particularly the former. Women spend several hours each day scouring the neighborhood

[18]Reducing kinship usage to the logical extremes to which the Yanomamö take it, there really is no discrepancy between theory and practice, except in the case of incest. When new villagers enter into contact for the first time, their respective headmen call each other *shawãri* (brothers-in-law). The first exchanges between the groups usually involve the children of these men. The children, of course, stand in unmarriageable relationship to each other because the children of brothers-in-law can, by the prescriptive definitions, marry.

[19]Many fieldworkers do not begin to see the patterns of behavior until they have spent months of intensive contact with their subjects. I was convinced, after five or six months, that there were almost no guidelines for behavior. A part of the difficulty resulted from the language barrier. The patterns began to emerge only after about six months, and only then could I begin asking pertinent questions about many features of social organization.

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New individuals are incorporated into the community by an extension of kinship ties. Unless one is incorporated into the village in this fashion, there is no basis for social behavior vis-à-vis others, for the kinship system defines one's role in society. An orphaned teen-ager joined Kaobawä's group shortly before I began my fieldwork. He was from a distant Shamatari village and had no blood relatives in Kaobawä's group. He established his position in the community by calling Kaobawä "father." This defined his relationship to all of Kaobawä's kinsmen as well. As an exercise in kinship, I had the young man give me his relationship term for everyone in the village. He not only had specific terms for every member of the group, but he had also extended them to all the residents of Lower Bisasi-teri and Monou-teri as well, since Kaobawä was related to these people. In short, the boy learned how Kaobawä was related to all the members of three different villages and logically extended his own assumed relationship to Kaobawä outward to the others: and he behaved toward them accordingly: He avoided women he called mother-in-law and refrained from sexual activities with women he called sister.

To emphasize the fact that the kinship categories do not always correspond to biological relationships, let me give an example of an incestuous marriage. Kaobawä's younger brother, Shiimima, recently (1966) took a young girl for his wife, outraging most of the community because he "behaved toward her as brother" before the marriage. The girl's mother had been abducted some twenty years earlier from a distant village and was given to a man who stood in a father relationship to Kaobawä and Shiimima. Thus, both Kaobawä and Shiimima called the abducted woman "mother" and called her daughter "sister." The abducted woman's husband died of malaria; after this, she had a number of temporary affairs with other men before being officially taken as a wife by another man in the village. Her daughter is the issue of a temporary affair she had with the headman of Mahekodo-teri, the group that gave Kaobawä refuge after the treacherous feast in 1950. She is, therefore, biologically unrelated to Kaobawä and Shiimima, but since they behaved toward her as brothers, Shiimima's marriage to her is a blatant case of incest. The matter was as disgusting to my informants as it would have been had Shiimima married his own biological sister.

There are many important kinship distinctions in Yąnomamö social life, but the one between relatives by marriage and agnatic relatives should particularly be emphasized. This distinction is at the basis of Yąnomamö political behavior and village fissioning. This point was emphasized in the discussion of village fissioning and marriage rules in the first section of this chapter.

One of the most important characteristics of affinal ties is that they are capable of growing in strength over time because they can be solidified and reinforced by marriage exchanges between the groups. Ties between agnates, on the other hand, tend to weaken over time. For example, Kaobawä's local descent group could renew its friendship to similar affinally related groups in the village of Patanowä-teri by entering into marriage exchanges with them once again. There is no way, however, in which his own descent group could reinforce or strengthen the agnatic ties with the local descent groups of the *Sha* lineage in Patanowä-teri. By marrying into the affinally related Patanowä-teri descent groups, Kaobawä's group would enter into direct competition with agnatic counterparts in that village, further straining the relationships between the two communities.

There is another way of looking at this situation. Men who are related to each other as agnates (for example, brothers and parallel cousins) get along well with each

other when they are children and young men. As time passes and these men become old enough to seek wives, members of the groups to which they belong enter into competition with each other. The men themselves are under some pressure to display their personal autonomy, and they treat each other with considerable reserve as they get older. They cannot boss each other around or expect many favors from one another. Kaobawä, for example, cannot ask his adult brothers to perform menial tasks for him. This is because each man—particularly those men who compete for the same women—attempts to convince all others that he is capable of ferocity. The more remote the genealogical distance, the greater is the reserve with which mature agnates treat each other. That is, distant parallel cousins would behave toward each other with considerably more reserve than would actual brothers, although the men in question are all related to each other terminologically as brothers. If such men live in different villages, their mutual relationships are even more reserved when they meet.

The relationship between men who call each other brother-in-law, however, grows more intimate as the men get older. They can play and joke with each other, whereas agnates cannot, for they are not competitors and are not constrained to exhibit their fierceness to each other. They can cement their relationships to each other by merely promising to give their daughters to each other's sons. They can ask favors of each other, expecting them to be done without complaint.

Kaobawä's relationships to two men in his village illustrate the distinction between agnates and affines. Both men joined his group from the village of Patanowä-teri some time after Kaobawä's group separated from the village. One of the men, Nadesiwä, is related to him agnatically: they call each other "brother" because their fathers were half-brothers. Nadesiwä is in Kaobawä's local descent group, but is not quite on a par with the other members in the political affairs of the group. The other men in the group—Kaobawä and his closer brothers—put pressure on Nadesiwä to give his only daughter to a man in a distant Shamatari village for the purpose of stabilizing an alliance. This was a considerable sacrifice for him to make, as his daughter, after the completion of bride service, will have to live in her husband's village—Nadesiwä will have no coresident son-in-law to provide him with meat when he gets old. Kaobawä and Nadesiwä treat each other with respect and great reserve and do not ask each other for favors.

The other man, Kumamawä, is Bahimi's actual brother; Kaobawä is related to him, therefore, as an affine as well as by cognatic kinship ties. That is, they are first cross-cousins by blood and also related to each other by marriage. Kumamawä is a frequent visitor in Kaobawä's house and enthusiastically executes the numerous tasks about Kaobawä's cabo of him. They are members of different local descent groups, but their groups are related to each other by marriage exchanges that go back several generations. In short, Kaobawä's personal ties to his brother-in-law are warmer and friendlier than his relationship to one of the members of his own local descent group.

Daily Activities

Kaobawä's village is oval-shaped. His house is located among those of his agnatic kinsmen; they occupy a continuous arc along one side of the village. Each of the

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The beleaguered partner may be obliged to remain in the village of his host for a year or longer, approximately the length of time required to establish a new plantation and productive base from which an independent existence is possible. Twice in the recent history of Kaobawä's group they were driven from their gardens by more powerful enemies and were forced to take refuge in the village of an ally. In each case the group remained with the ally for a year or so, moving away only after their new garden began producing. In both cases, the hosts demanded and received a number of women from Kaobawä's group without reciprocating in kind, a prerogative they exercised from their temporary position of strength. The longer the group takes advantage of a hosts' protection, the higher is the cost in terms of women, so visitors always make an attempt to establish their gardens as quickly as possible and move into them as soon as they begin producing. Without allies, therefore, the members of a village would either have to remain at their single garden and sustain the attacks of their enemies or disband into several smaller groups and join larger villages on a permanent basis, losing many of their women to their protectors. The jungle simply does not produce enough wild foods to sustain larger groups, and the threat of warfare is such that smaller groups would soon be discovered by their enemies and exterminated.

Because of the ever-present risk of being driven from one's garden, therefore, no Yanomamö village can continue to exist as a sovereign entity without establishing alliances with other groups. Warfare is attended by a bellicose ideology which asserts that strong villages should take advantage of weaker ones and coerce them out of women; to prevent this, all villages should therefore behave as if they were strong. Thus, the military threat creates a situation in which intervillage alliance is desirable, but at the same time spawns a military ideology that inhibits the formation of such alliances: Allies need but cannot trust each other. They are obliged to behave aggressively in order to display their respective strength.

Alliances between villages are the product of a developmental sequence that involves casual trading, mutual feasting, and finally the exchange of women. The most intimate allies are those who, in addition to trading and feasting, exchange women. Any developing alliance may stabilize at the trading or feasting stage without proceeding to the woman-exchange phase. These are weak alliances, but serve to limit the degree of war that might possibly obtain between the villages so related: The Yanomamö tend to avoid attacking those villages with which they trade and feast, unless some specific incident, such as the abduction of a woman, provokes them. Allies that are linked by trade and feasting ties, for example, rarely accuse each other of practicing harmful magic. Allies bound to each other by affinal kinship ties, however, are more interdependent because they are under obligation to each other to continue to exchange women. It is, in fact, by the exchange of women that independent villages extend kinship ties to each other.

Members of allied villages are usually reluctant to take the final step in alliance formation and cede women to their partners, for they are always worried that the latter might not reciprocate as promised. This attitude is especially conspicuous in smaller villages, for their larger partners in defense pressure them into demonstrating their solidarity by ceding women; the strong can and do coerce the weak in Yanomamö politics. The weak, therefore, are compelled to exaggerate their strength by bluff and intimidation and by attempting in general to appear to be stronger, militarily, than they really are, thereby hoping to convince their partners that they are equals, capable of an independent

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existence. By so doing, they also inform their partners that any attempt to coerce them out of women will be met with the appropriate reaction, such as a chest-pounding duel or club fight. Nevertheless, each ally expects to gain women in the alliance and enters it with this in mind; and each hopes to gain more women than it cedes in return.

Hence, in order for an occasional nervous meeting of groups of men from different villages to evolve into a stable intervillage alliance based on the reciprocal exchange of women, the long and difficult road of feasting and trading must be traversed. Suspicion must give way to relative confidence, and this must develop into reciprocal feasting during the dry season. Only then has the intervillage relationship reached a point where the partners begin ceding women to each other; and even then, it is done reluctantly.

This is, however, only the ideal pattern in the development of an alliance. Rarely does it develop far enough to reach the stage where women change hands, particularly if the two villages concerned are of approximately the same military strength. Fights and arguments over women or food develop, and the principals withdraw temporarily on semihostile terms, perhaps attempting a rapprochement sometime in the future. Or, if the principals are obviously different military potential, the stronger of the two will coerce its weaker partner into ceding women early in the alliance development, taking advantage of its own military strength, thus altering the course of alliance development in the opposite direction.

Whatever the specific developmental sequence leading to the woman-exchange phase, the milieu within which these developments take place is not conducive to the establishment of warm ties of friendship. Each of the principals attempts to demonstrate his own sovereignty in order to convince the other that he does not really require political alliance to keep his enemies in check. This is accomplished by bragging about past military victories and fierceness in past club fights and chest-pounding duels, and by insinuating that one's group is always on the verge of exploding into a force so great that no combination of allies could overcome its terrible might. The smaller the village and more obvious its vulnerability, the greater is the pressure to insinuate or to demonstrate this potential.

Political maneuvering in this milieu is both a tricky and potentially hazardous undertaking. Each principal in the negotiation must establish the credibility of his own threats, while discovering the point at which his partner's bluff will dissolve abruptly into action; he must discover the point beyond which he must not goad his ally, lest he himself is prepared to suffer the possibly violent outcome. It is a politics of brinkmanship, a form of political behavior in which each negotiator is compelled to expose his opposite's threats as bluffs at the risk of inciting him to violence—a club fight, immediately and honorably, or, later and treacherously, a feast in which the hosts descend on their guests to kill their men and abduct their women.

Trading and Feasting in Alliance Formation

Because an ally is not beyond taking advantage of his weaker partner, especially when the alliance is just developing, there is very little in the way of natural attraction to encourage the two groups to visit each other. Considerations of pride and canons of ferocity preclude obvious attempts to develop stable and predictable alliances and military

a local shortage of the item in order to have to rely on an ally for it, giving sufficient cause to visit them.

Often the specialization is less individualized than in the case of clay pot manufacture. Kaobawë's group, for example, exports cotton yarn to one ally, but imports it from another. The exported cotton frequently is brought back in the form of manufactured hammocks, the importer merely contributing labor to the process. In some cases the shortages are merely seasonal; Kaobawë's group may import cotton from a particular ally at one time of the year, but export it at another. Most of the trade, however, involves items that are readily manufactured by or raised by any group, underscoring the fact that trade is the stimulus to visit. Food does not enter the trading system, although hospitality dictates that it must be given to friendly groups. Occasionally, a village will run short of plantains because of a particularly long hot spell, and its members may visit an ally to borrow food to last a week or so. This hospitality is usually reciprocated, but it is not a part of the trading network.

Alliances between villages may stabilize at any one of three points: sporadic reciprocal trading, mutual feasting, or reciprocal women exchange. These are cumulative levels in the sense that the third phase implies the first two: Allies that exchange women also feast and trade with each other. Likewise, allies that merely feast together also trade, but do not exchange women. At the lower end of this scale of solidarity lie those villages with which one fights to kill, while at the upper end are those villages from whom one's group has recently separated. Frequently, the scale is circular rather than linear: A village's mortal enemy is the group from which it has recently split. By way of example, Kaobawë's group trades sporadically with the Makorima-teri, Daiyari-teri, Widokaiya-teri, Mishekodo-teri, and Iyawei-teri. These are fairly weak alliances and even permit limited fighting. His group has more intimate ties with the Reyaboböwei-teri and Mamariböwei-teri, with whom it feasts regularly. The alliance with the Reyaboböwei-teri has even reached the point at which they are exchanging women with each other. Finally, at the other end of the scale, Kaobawë's group is at war with the Iwahikorobä-teri, Möwamobä-teri, and Patanowä-teri. The first two of these groups are historically unrelated to Kaobawë's group, although they have a common history with two of his staunchest allies, the Reyaboböwei-teri and Mämaribowei-teri, from whom they separated in the past. The Patanowä-teri are related to Kaobawë and his followers, as was shown in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, they are bitter enemies and are at present raiding each other.

Although there is no rigid geographical correlation of the village settlement pattern to the degree of alliance solidarity, neighboring villages usually are at least on trading terms and are not actively conducting war on each other. Should war develop between neighbors, one of the two principals will abandon its site and move to a new location. Whether the ties between neighboring villages will be one of blood, marriage exchange, reciprocal feasting, or casual trading depends on a large number of factors, particularly on village size, current warfare situation with respect to more distant groups, and the precise historical ties between the neighboring villages. Whatever the nature of the ties between neighbors, each strives to maintain its sovereignty and independence from the others.

The Yanomamö do not openly regard trade as a mechanism the ulterior function of which is to bring people repeatedly together, thus establishing an amicable basis from

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he was not enthusiastic about going on the raid, despite the fact that he lectured the younger members of the raiding party about their overt reluctance and cowardice. He was older, however, and had to display the ferocity that adult men are supposed to show. In short, although Hukoshikawë probably had very little desire as an individual to participate in the raiding, he was obliged to do so by the pressures of the entire system. He could ill afford to remain neutral, as his very own kinsmen-even Kaobawë-implied by word and action that it was disgusting for him not to avenge the death of his brother; and some of his kinsmen in other villages openly accused him of cowardice for not chasing the raiders when they shot Dumowë. Again, his erstwhile allies, when they complained about having to feed him and his relatives, were blunt and discourteous. The Shamatari allies even managed to demand a number of women from Hukoshikawë's group in payment for girls they had given them earlier, when the Monou-teri were superordinate in the alliance pecking order. In short, if Hukoshikawë failed to put on a show of ferocity and vindictiveness, it would not be long before his friends in allied villages would be taking even greater liberties and demanding more women. Thus, the system worked against him and demanded that he be fierce. Since his own group was small, it had to protect its sovereignty even more rigorously, or be absorbed by a greedy ally whose protection would be tendered at the price of women.

Hukoshikawë and his raiders did not locate the Patanowë-teri on this raid, although they searched for over a week. They knew it would be difficult to find them in the rainy season, largely because they would have to take many detours around impassable swamps. It was with this in mind that they brought their larger-than-usual supply of plantains.

The war was still being conducted, but on a lesser scale, when I returned to Monou-teri a year later. They had managed to kill two Patanowë-teri and abduct two women. The Patanowë-teri only killed one Monou-teri, the headman. Hence, the Monou-teri, at least for the time being, came out ahead. The Patanowë-teri will not cease raiding them until they kill at least one more Monou-teri, but then the Monou-teri will be obliged to avenge this death when *it* occurs.

There will probably be a respite to the raiding because the Patanowë-teri group fissioned and subsequently lost a significant fraction of their numbers. The Monou-teri have completed their move to the new garden and now live there. If the raiding stops, they will be able to live alternatively between their two gardens at any season. Otherwise, they can only occupy their old site in the peak of the wet season. Having two gardens makes them more independent of their allies, and they can again be aggressive in their political dealings with them. Since they have exchanged women with one of their Shamatari allies and are now living only a half-day's journey from them, they most likely will bind their political fate to the fate of this ally. Their relationships to the two Binasi-teri groups, on the other hand, will probably grow cool. Already, the Monou-teri have taken sides with their Shamatari allies in club fights against the Upper Binasi-teri, and they still resent the fact that the Lower Binasi-teri forcefully took one of the abducted Patanowë-teri women away from them. Despite the fact that the Monou-teri share a common history and common blood with the two Binasi-teri groups, they are now entering into a political situation that frequently leads such related groups to mutual hostilities.

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